Solidarity in preference aggregation: Improving on a status quo

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Harless, Patrick
• 署名单位: University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.009
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 73-87
• 关键词: Welfare dominance under preference replacement; Preference aggregation; Status quo rules

摘要

Working in the Arrowian framework, we search for preference aggregation rules with desirable solidarity properties. In a fixed-population setting, we formulate two versions of the solidarity axiom welfare dominance under preference replacement. Although the stronger proves incompatible with efficiency, the combination of efficiency and our second version leads to an important class of rules which improve upon a status quo order. These rules are also strategy-proof, which reveals a further connection between solidarity and incentive properties. Allowing the population to vary, we again characterize the status quo rules by efficiency and a different solidarity axiom, population monotonicity. This extends a similar characterization of a subclass of these rules by Bossert and Sprumont (2014). (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.