Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Terstiege, Stefan
• 署名单位: Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.009
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 70-87
• 关键词: principal agent; information acquisition; rent seeking; sequential screening

摘要

I study information gathering for rent-seeking purposes in contracting. In my model, an agent learns his payoff type only after accepting a contract, but can at costs acquire imperfect information while deliberating whether to accept. I show that the principal deters the acquisition if and only if the costs are high. The result stands in contrast to a finding by Cremer and Khalil (1992), who demonstrate that the acquisition of perfect information will always be deterred. A key insight is that the case of imperfect information is an instance of a sequential-screening problem. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.