Coordination under limited depth of reasoning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kneeland, Terri
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.011
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 49-64
• 关键词: Coordination games; level-k models; Cognitive hierarchy models; Global games.

摘要

This paper provides the first unified explanation of behavior in coordinated attack games under both public and private information. It demonstrates that the main experimental results, such as threshold strategies, comparative statics, and the differences in behavior under public and private information, are robust predictions of limited depth of reasoning models. This is in contrast to equilibrium, which mispredicts the coordinating roles of public and private information. The analysis has implications for understanding macroeconomic phenomena, like currency attacks and debt crises, which are commonly modeled using incomplete information coordinated attack games. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.