Objective and subjective compliance: A norm-based explanation of 'moral wiggle room'

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Spiekermann, Kai; Weiss, Arne
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Carl von Ossietzky Universitat Oldenburg; University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.007
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 170-183
• 关键词: Norm compliance; uncertainty; experiment; Self-serving biases; strategic learning; dictator game

摘要

We propose a cognitive-dissonance model of norm compliance to identify conditions for selfishly biased information acquisition. The model distinguishes between objective norm compliers, for whom the right action is a function of the state of the world, and subjective norm compliers, for whom it is a function of their belief. The former seek as much information as possible; the latter acquire only information that lowers, in expected terms, normative demands. The source of 'moral wiggle room' is not belief manipulation, but the coarseness of normative prescriptions under conditions of uncertainty. In a novel experimental setup, we find evidence for such strategic information uptake. Our results suggest that attempts to change behavior by subjecting individuals to norms can lead to biased information acquisition instead of compliance. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.