The power of money: Wealth effects in contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schroyen, Fred; Treich, Nicolas
• 署名单位: Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); INRAE; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.005
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 46-68
• 关键词: CONFLICT; Contest; rent-seeking; WEALTH; risk aversion; lobbying; POWER; redistribution

摘要

The relationship between wealth and power has long been debated. Nevertheless, this relationship has been rarely studied in a strategic game. In this paper, we study wealth effects in a strategic contest game. Two opposing effects arise: wealth reduces the marginal cost of effort but it also reduces the marginal benefit of winning the contest. We consider three types of contests which vary depending on whether rents and efforts are commensurable with wealth. Our theoretical analysis shows that the effects of wealth are strongly contest-dependent. It thus does not support general claims that the rich lobby more or that low economic growth and wealth inequality spur conflicts. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.