Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dato, Simon; Grunewald, Andreas; Kraekel, Matthias; Mueller, Daniel
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; University of Wurzburg
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.013
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 273-300
• 关键词: Invisibility hypothesis; Poaching; Promotion-as-signal hypothesis

摘要

This paper provides evidence that inefficient promotion strategies and large wage increases upon promotion may both arise as a consequence of asymmetric employer information. Building on the seminal work by Waldman (1984a) and Milgrom and Oster (1987), we first present a model that illustrates how both phenomena may jointly arise due to the information revealing character of promotions. Using experimental labor markets, we find evidence consistent with asymmetric employer information being a causal factor for both inefficient promotions and large wage increases upon promotion. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of asymmetric employer information on profits and turnover. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.