Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Martini, Giorgio
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.007
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 172-179
• 关键词: Random assignment; random serial dictatorship; strategy-proofness; ordinal efficiency; Non-wastefulness

摘要

I prove there exists no assignment mechanism that is strategy-proof, non-wasteful and satisfies equal treatment of equals. When outside options may exist, this strengthens the impossibility result of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) by weakening ordinal efficiency to non-wastefulness. My result solves an open question posed by Erdil (2014) and complements his results on the efficient frontier of random assignment mechanisms. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.