Competitive equilibria in school assignment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dur, Umut; Morrill, Thayer
• 署名单位: North Carolina State University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.003
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 269-274
• 关键词: Top trading cycles; school choice; competitive equilibria

摘要

Top Trading Cycles was originally developed as an elegant method for finding a competitive equilibrium of Shapley and Scarf's housing market. We extend the definition of a competitive equilibrium to the school assignment problem and show that there remains a profound relationship between Top Trading Cycles and a competitive equilibrium. Specifically, in every competitive equilibrium with weakly decreasing prices, the equilibrium assignment is unique and exactly corresponds to the Top Trading Cycles assignment. This provides a new way of interpreting the worth of a student's priority at a given school. It also provides a new way of explaining Top Trading Cycles to students and a school board. (C) 2017 Published by Elsevier Inc.