Vendettas

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bolle, Friedel; Tan, Jonathan H. W.; Zizzo, Daniel John
• 署名单位: European University Viadrina Frankfurt Oder; University of Nottingham; University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.2.93
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 93-130
• 关键词: neural basis; PUNISHMENT; emotions; RECIPROCITY; catharsis; BEHAVIOR; sabotage; dilemma

摘要

Vendettas occur in many real-world settings where rivals compete for a prize, e.g., winning a competitive promotion or retaining a job, by engaging in aggressive, retaliatory behavior. We present a benchmark experiment where two players have an initial probability of winning a prize. Retaliatory vendettas occur and lead subjects to the worst possible outcomes in 2/3 of cases, counter to self-interest predictions, with large inefficiencies even in the absence of any immediate gain from aggression. Negative emotions are important and interact with the economic setting to produce large social inefficiencies. Allowing cooling off periods reduces aggression.