Risk-Taking and Risk-Sharing Incentives under Moral Hazard

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Belhaj, Mohamed; Bourles, Renaud; Deroian, Frederic
• 署名单位: Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.1.58
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 58-90
• 关键词: vulnerability; management; insurance; selection; transfers; networks; return

摘要

This paper explores the effect of moral hazard on both risk-taking and informal risk-sharing incentives. Two agents invest in their own project, each choosing a level of risk and effort, and share risk through transfers. This can correspond to farmers in developing countries, who share risk and decide individually upon the adoption of a risky technology. The paper mainly shows that the impact of moral hazard on risk crucially depends on the observability of investment risk, whereas the impact on transfers is much more utility dependent.