At Least Do No Harm: The Use of Scarce Data
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Sandroni, Alvaro
署名单位：
Northwestern University
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7669
DOI：
10.1257/mic.6.1.1
发表日期：
2014
页码：
1-4
关键词：
摘要：
When data is scarce, it is difficult to screen the opinions of informed and uninformed experts. In spite of this difficulty it is possible to deliver incentives for informed experts to honestly reveal their views, and for uninformed experts to do no harm to a principal in the sense that uninformed experts report the view the principal held originally (i.e., without the expert's report). This follows even if there is only a single data point to evaluate the expert's opinions and the expert's preferences over risk are unknown.
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