House Allocation with Overlapping Generations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kurino, Morimitsu
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.1.258
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 258-289
• 关键词: Existing tenants; school choice; assignment; serial

摘要

Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, each year college freshmen move in and seniors move out of on-campus housing. Each student stays on campus for only a few years. A student is a newcomer in the beginning and then becomes an existing tenant. Motivated by this observation, we introduce a model of house allocation with overlapping generations. In terms of a dynamic rule without monetary transfers, we examine two static rules of serial dictatorship and top trading cycles. We support these seniority-based rules in terms of their dynamic Pareto efficiency and incentive compatibility.