Resisting Moral Wiggle Room: How Robust Is Reciprocal Behavior?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: van der Weele, Joel J.; Kulisa, Julija; Kosfeld, Michael; Friebel, Guido
• 署名单位: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam; Goethe University Frankfurt
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.3.256
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 256-264
• 关键词: dictator; incentives; fairness; trust; image; game

摘要

We provide the second mover in a trust game and a moonlighting game with an excuse for not reciprocating. While this type of manipulation has been shown to strongly reduce giving in the dictator game, we find that the availability of the excuse has no effect on the incidence of reciprocal behavior in these games. Our results cast doubt on the generalizability of previous dictator game findings and suggest that image concerns are not a key driver of reciprocal behavior.