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作者：Biglaiser, Gary; Gu, Jiadong; Li, Fei
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; Zhejiang University
摘要：We consider the equilibrium interplay between sellers' price competition and consumers' perception of product differentiation. We analyze a situation where, before trading, consumers acquire information at a cost about their preferences between sellers' differentiated products. The incentive for information acquisition depends on the average value of products, the objective product differentiation, and their beliefs about sellers' prices. The acquired information shapes consumers' perceived pr...
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作者：Krasikov, Ilia; Lamba, Rohit
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Cornell University
摘要：This paper builds a theory of dynamic pricing for the sale of timed goods. The main friction is private and evolving valuation of the buyer prior to the date of consumption, which follows a Poisson process. A combination of membership fees and continuously increasing prices induces a threshold response from the buyer, endogenously segmenting the market along timing of purchase. This pricing mechanism achieves the deterministic global optimum. The tools developed here are shown to be useful in ...
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作者：Caradonna, Peter; Miller, Nathan h.; Sheu, Gloria
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Georgetown University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：We model merger-induced entry in the context of differentiated-products price competition. We fully characterize the combinations of merger efficiencies and entrant qualities that can mitigate the adverse equilibrium welfare effects of an otherwise anticompetitive merger. The possibility of merger-induced entry introduces nonmonotonicity into the equilibrium value that consumers receive from merger efficiencies, potentially necessitating the joint analysis of efficiencies and entry in merger r...
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作者：Chatterjee, Kalyan; Dong, Miaomiao; Hoshino, Tetsuya
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：We consider an ultimatum game where the value of the object being sold to the buyer is high or low. The seller knows the value, but the buyer does not. The value to the seller is zero. We introduce the option for the buyer to acquire costly information after an offer is made. This information either confirms the high value or provides no information. As the cost of information vanishes, the buyer gets all the surplus in a refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, although the option to acqui...
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作者：Li, Xuelin; Szydlowski, Martin
作者单位：Columbia University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We study pivots as signaling devices in a dynamic experimentation model. An entrepreneur receives funding from an investor and has private information about a project, which requires costly experimentation to succeed. The entrepreneur has a real option to pivot, i.e., to abandon the project and to start a new one. Investors learn about the project from the arrival of exogenous information and from the entrepreneur's pivoting decisions. We characterize signaling equilibria in which high-skill e...
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作者：Ball, Ian
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score. Based on the score, the receiver makes a decision. The sender prefers higher decisions, and she can distort each feature at a privately known cost. I characterize the scoring rule that maximizes decision accuracy. This rule underweights some features to deter sender distortion, and overweights other features so tha...
