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作者：Dutta, Rohan; Horan, Sean
作者单位：McGill University; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：A wide variety of choice behavior inconsistent with preference maximization can be explained by Manzini and Mariotti's Rational Shortlist Methods. Choices are made by sequentially applying a pair of asymmetric binary relations (rationales) to eliminate inferior alternatives. Manzini and Mariotti's axiomatic treatment elegantly describes which behavior can be explained by this model. However, it leaves unanswered what can be inferred, from observed behavior, about the underlying rationales. Est...
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作者：Skrzypacz, Andrzej; Toikka, Juuso
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：How does feasibility of efficient repeated trade depend on the features of the environment such as persistence of values, private information about their evolution, or trading frequency? We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for efficient, unsubsidized, and voluntary trade, which implies that efficient contracting requires sufficient congruence of expectations. This translates to bounds on persistence of values and on private information about their evolution, and distinguishes increa...
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作者：Bryan, Gharad; Karlan, Dean; Zinman, Jonathan
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA); Yale University; Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA); National Bureau of Economic Research; Dartmouth College
摘要：Empirical evidence on peer intermediation lags behind both theory and practice in which lenders use peers to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard. Using a referral incentive under individual liability, we develop a two-stage field experiment that permits separate identification of peer screening and enforcement. Our key contribution is to allow for borrower heterogeneity in both ex ante repayment type and ex post susceptibility to social pressure. Our method allows identification of sel...
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作者：Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We analyze preferences over redistribution in societies with costly (positive) sorting according to income. We identify a new motivation for redistribution, where individuals support taxation in order to reduce the incentives to sort. We characterize a simple condition over income distributions which implies that even relatively rich voters with income above the mean-will prefer full equality (and thus no sorting) to societies with costly sorting. We show that the condition is satisfied for re...
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作者：Maccheroni, Fabio; Marinacci, Massimo; Rustichini, Aldo
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作者：Roux, Nicolas; Sobel, Joel
作者单位：Max Planck Society; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Experiments identify the empirical regularity that groups tend to make decisions that are more extreme, but in the same direction as the tendency of individual members of the group. We present a model of information aggregation consistent with these findings. We assume individuals and groups are rational decision makers facing monotone statistical decision problems where groups and individuals have common preferences, but groups have superior information. We provide conditions under which the ...
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作者：Itoh, Hideshi; Morita, Hodaka
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We investigate whether formal contracts can help in resolving the holdup problem by studying repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer. Contrary to previous findings, we demonstrate that a simple fixed-price contract based on product delivery is of value even when relation-specific investment is purely cooperative. Furthermore, we show that focusing our attention on fixed-price contracts as a form of formal contracts is without loss of generality. The key driving force is a possibilit...
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作者：Bhattacharya, Sourav; Deb, Joyee; Kundu, Tapas
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; New York University; UiT The Arctic University of Tromso
摘要：We study the role of intergroup mobility in the emergence of conflict. Two groups compete for the right to allocate society's resources. We allow for costly intergroup mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, which the opposition can accept or reject, and wage conflict. Agents can also switch group membership. Expropriating a large share of resources increases political strength by attracting opposition members, but implies a higher threat of conflict. Our main finding is that the pos...
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作者：Francetich, Alejandro
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：This paper addresses the problem of sequentially allocating time-sensitive goods, or one-period leases on a durable good, among agents who compete through time and learn about the common component of their valuation privately through experience. I show that efficiency is unattainable, and I identify simple variations of sequential second-price or English auctions that implement the second best and the revenue-maximizing auctions. When the units are divisible, I identify the corresponding aucti...
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作者：Elfenbein, Daniel W.; Fisman, Raymond; McManus, Brian
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：Quality certification programs help consumers identify high-quality products or sellers in markets with information asymmetries. Using data from eBay UK's online marketplace, we study how certification's impact on demand varies with market- and seller-level attributes, exploiting variation in sellers' certification status within groups of near-identical listings. The positive effects of eBay's top rated seller certification are stronger for categories with few other certified sellers, in more ...
