Market Structure, Reputation, and the Value of Quality Certification

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Elfenbein, Daniel W.; Fisman, Raymond; McManus, Brian
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130182
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 83-108
• 关键词: restaurant hygiene; INFORMATION; disclosure; substitute; cards

摘要

Quality certification programs help consumers identify high-quality products or sellers in markets with information asymmetries. Using data from eBay UK's online marketplace, we study how certification's impact on demand varies with market- and seller-level attributes, exploiting variation in sellers' certification status within groups of near-identical listings. The positive effects of eBay's top rated seller certification are stronger for categories with few other certified sellers, in more competitive markets, and for sellers with shorter records of past performance. These findings indicate certification provides more value when certification is rare, the product space is crowded, and for sellers lacking established reputations.