Mechanisms for Repeated Trade

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Skrzypacz, Andrzej; Toikka, Juuso
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140173
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 252-293
• 关键词: efficient mechanisms; private information; Dynamic mechanism; games

摘要

How does feasibility of efficient repeated trade depend on the features of the environment such as persistence of values, private information about their evolution, or trading frequency? We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for efficient, unsubsidized, and voluntary trade, which implies that efficient contracting requires sufficient congruence of expectations. This translates to bounds on persistence of values and on private information about their evolution, and distinguishes increasing patience from more frequent interaction; the latter need not facilitate efficiency even when the former does. We also discuss second-best mechanisms and extend the characterization to general dynamic collective choice problems.