Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Itoh, Hideshi; Morita, Hodaka
• 署名单位: Hitotsubashi University; University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130111
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 318-346
• 关键词: hold-up problem; standard breach remedies; cooperative investments; incentive contracts; explicit contracts; implicit contracts; firm; OWNERSHIP; RENEGOTIATION; integration

摘要

We investigate whether formal contracts can help in resolving the holdup problem by studying repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer. Contrary to previous findings, we demonstrate that a simple fixed-price contract based on product delivery is of value even when relation-specific investment is purely cooperative. Furthermore, we show that focusing our attention on fixed-price contracts as a form of formal contracts is without loss of generality. The key driving force is a possibility that the relation-specific investment decreases the surplus under no trade. This possibility, although very plausible, has been largely ignored in previous analyses of the holdup problem.