Group Polarization in a Model of Information Aggregation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Roux, Nicolas; Sobel, Joel
• 署名单位: Max Planck Society; University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140252
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 202-232
• 关键词: Group decisions; shifts

摘要

Experiments identify the empirical regularity that groups tend to make decisions that are more extreme, but in the same direction as the tendency of individual members of the group. We present a model of information aggregation consistent with these findings. We assume individuals and groups are rational decision makers facing monotone statistical decision problems where groups and individuals have common preferences, but groups have superior information. We provide conditions under which the distribution of the optimal actions of the group is more variable than the distribution of actions taken by individuals.