Referrals: Peer Screening and Enforcement in a Consumer Credit Field Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bryan, Gharad; Karlan, Dean; Zinman, Jonathan
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA); Yale University; Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA); National Bureau of Economic Research; Dartmouth College
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130234
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 174-204
• 关键词: repayment incentives; Joint liability; INFORMATION; Microcredit; insurance; selection; MARKETS; impacts; CHOICE; agents

摘要

Empirical evidence on peer intermediation lags behind both theory and practice in which lenders use peers to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard. Using a referral incentive under individual liability, we develop a two-stage field experiment that permits separate identification of peer screening and enforcement. Our key contribution is to allow for borrower heterogeneity in both ex ante repayment type and ex post susceptibility to social pressure. Our method allows identification of selection on repayment likelihood, selection on susceptibility to social pressure, and loan enforcement. Implementing our method in South Africa we find no evidence of screening but large enforcement effects.