Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner's Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Francetich, Alejandro
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130226
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 45-76
• 关键词: common-value auctions; Ex-post implementation; interdependent valuations; asymmetric information; DESIGN; PRIVATE

摘要

This paper addresses the problem of sequentially allocating time-sensitive goods, or one-period leases on a durable good, among agents who compete through time and learn about the common component of their valuation privately through experience. I show that efficiency is unattainable, and I identify simple variations of sequential second-price or English auctions that implement the second best and the revenue-maximizing auctions. When the units are divisible, I identify the corresponding auctions that allow for double sourcing.