Evolution of Impatience: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levine, David K.; Modica, Salvatore; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Zurita, Felipe
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); European University Institute; University of Palermo; Universidad de San Andres Argentina; Centro Nacional Patagonico (CENPAT); Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130188
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 295-317
• 关键词: time preference; ECONOMICS; selection; MODEL; equilibrium; BEHAVIOR

摘要

The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, often finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in games where equilibrium involves threat of punishment there are forces generating an evolutionary advantage to the impatient. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, efficiency may also favor impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the opposite direction.