Learning from Others? Decision Rights, Strategic Communication, and Reputational Concerns

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Tinbergen Institute; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130146
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 109-149
• 关键词: information; incentives; MODEL

摘要

We examine centralized versus decentralized decision making when experience of agents is private information and communication is necessary to learn from others. An agent has reputational concerns and his market may or may not observe what the other agent chooses (global versus local markets). With decentralized decision making, agents' willingness to communicate depends heavily on what a market observes. Strikingly, less communication may improve welfare. If markets are global, centralization outperforms decentralization as it makes communication possible, and communication is informative for any finite degree of conflict among agents and with the center.