When Is It Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-Track Authority

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Celik, Levent; Karabay, Bilgehan; McLaren, John
• 署名单位: HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT); University of Virginia
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140031
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 347-389
• 关键词: trade-policy; equilibrium; MODEL

摘要

With fast-track authority (FTA), the US Congress delegates trade-policy authority to the president by committing not to amend a trade agreement. Why would it cede such power? We suggest an interpretation in which Congress uses FTA to forestall destructive competition between its members for protectionist rents. In our model: (i) FTA is never granted if an industry operates in the majority of districts; (ii) The more symmetric the industrial pattern, the more likely is FTA, since competition for protectionist rents is most punishing when bargaining power is symmetrically distributed; (iii) Widely disparate initial tariffs prevent free trade even with FTA.