Belief Elicitation with a Synchronized Lottery Choice Menu That Is Invariant to Risk Attitudes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Holt, Charles A.; Smith, Angela M.
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; James Madison University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130274
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 110-139
• 关键词: proper scoring rules; eliciting beliefs; bayes rule; INFORMATION; decisions; ambiguity; utility

摘要

This paper uses a Bayesian information processing task to compare belief elicitation mechanisms including a quadratic scoring rule, a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak pricing procedure, and a two-stage menu of lottery choices that is structured to identify a precise point of probability indifference. The choice menu yields a higher incidence of correct Bayesian responses and lower belief error averages. Unlike the quadratic scoring rule, the binary payoffs for the lottery choice mechanism are synchronized to provide theoretical incentive-compatibility regardless of risk attitudes. In addition, the choice menu structure is more transparent and intuitive than the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure.