Harsanyi's Aggregation Theorem with Incomplete Preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Danan, Eric; Gajdos, Thibault; Tallon, Jean-Marc
• 署名单位: CY Cergy Paris Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130117
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 61-69
• 关键词: interpersonal comparisons; completeness axiom; expected utility; decision-making; uncertainty; beliefs; REPRESENTATION; welfare; CHOICE; tastes

摘要

We provide a generalization of Harsanyi's (1955) aggregation theorem to the case of incomplete preferences at the individual and social level. Individuals and society have possibly incomplete expected utility preferences that are represented by sets of expected utility functions. Under Pareto indifference, social preferences are represented through a set of aggregation rules that are utilitarian in a generalized sense. Strengthening Pareto indifference to Pareto preference provides a refinement of the representation.