Choice and Matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chambers, Christopher P.; Yenmez, M. Bumin
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; Boston College
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150236
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 126-147
• 关键词: School choice; Lattice structure; stable matchings; STABILITY; MARKETS; set; admissions; CONTRACTS; DESIGN

摘要

We study path-independent choice rules applied to a matching context. We use a classic representation of these choice rules to introduce a powerful technique for matching theory. Using this technique, we provide a deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and study its properties. Next, we obtain a compelling comparative static result: if one agent's choice expands, the remaining agents on her side of the market are made worse off, while agents on the other side of the market are made better off. Finally, we establish several results related to path-independent choice rules.