Resale Price Maintenance with Secret Contracts and Retail Service Externalities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Johansen, Bjorn Olav
• 署名单位: University of Bergen
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140280
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 63-87
• 关键词: want fair trade; vertical restraints; Bilateral contracts; nondiscrimination; exclusivity; opportunism; UNIFORMITY

摘要

We analyze a setting where a monopolist sells through retailers that set prices and provide valuable but non-contractible services to customers. We assume that contracts are private. We find that purely bilateral price restraints have no effect on the equilibrium outcome and that the standard Bertrand prices and service levels prevail. We also show that if manufacturers can commit to industry-wide resale prices, they can obtain higher prices and service levels but will generally not be able to achieve the fully integrated outcome. Using a specific linear demand system, we find that industry-wide price floors are harmful to consumers.