Strategic Ignorance in Sequential Procurement
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Krasteva, Silvana; Yildirim, Huseyin
署名单位：
Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Duke University
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7669
DOI：
10.1257/mic.20170076
发表日期：
2019
页码：
131-172
关键词：
摘要：
Should a buyer approach sellers of complementary goods informed or uninformed of her private valuations, and if informed, in which sequence? In this paper, we show that an informed buyer would start with the high-value seller to minimize future holdup. Informed (or careful) sequencing may, however, hurt the buyer as sellers read into it. The buyer may, therefore, commit to ignorance, perhaps, by overloading herself with unrelated tasks, delegating the sequencing decision, or letting sellers self-schedule. Absent such commitment, we show that ignorance is not time-consistent for the buyer, but it increases trade. Evidence on land assembly supports our findings.
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