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作者：Kuvalekar, Aditya; Lipnowski, Elliot
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Columbia University
摘要：We examine the relationship between job security and productivity in a fixed wage worker-firm relationship facing match quality uncertainty. The worker's action affects both learning and current productivity. The firm, seeing worker behavior and outcomes, makes a firing decision. As bad news accrues, the firm cannot commit to retain the worker. This creates perverse incentives: the worker strategically slows learning, harming productivity. We fully characterize the unique equilibrium in our co...
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作者：Heller, Yuval; Winter, Eyal
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; Lancaster University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We investigate how distorted, yet structured, beliefs can persist in strategic situations. Specifically, we study two-player games in which each player is endowed with a biased-belief function that represents the discrepancy between a player's beliefs about the opponent's strategy and the actual strategy. Our equilibrium condition requires that (i) each player choose a best-response strategy to his distorted belief about the opponent's strategy, and (ii) the distortion functions form best resp...
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作者：Lee, Frances Xu; Wing Suen
作者单位：Loyola University Chicago; University of Hong Kong
摘要：The lack of hard evidence in allegations about sexual misconduct makes it difficult to separate true allegations from false ones. We provide a model in which victims and potential libelers face the same costs and benefits from making an allegation, but the tendency for perpetrators of sexual misconduct to engage in repeat offenses allows semiseparation to occur, which lends credibility to such allegations. Our model also explains why reports about sexual misconduct are often delayed, and why t...
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作者：Fan, Ying; Yang, Chenyu
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Rochester
摘要：This paper studies (1) whether, from a welfare point of view, oligopolistic competition leads to too few or too many products in a market, and (2) how a change in competition affects the number and the composition of product offerings. We address these two questions in the context of the US smartphone market. Our findings show that this market contains too few products and that a reduction in competition decreases both the number and variety of products. These results suggest that product choi...
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作者：Dai, Weijia; Luca, Michael
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Harvard University
摘要：Collaborating with Yelp and the City of San Francisco, we revisit a canonical example of quality disclosure by evaluating and helping to redesign the posting of restaurant hygiene scores on Yelp.com . We implement a two-stage intervention that separately identifies consumer response to information disclosure and a disclosure design with improved salience-a consumer alert. We find score posting is effective, but improving salience further increases consumer response.
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作者：Hanany, Eran; Klibano, Peter; Mukerji, Sujoy
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Northwestern University; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We study incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players. Our focus is on equilibrium concepts satisfying sequential optimality-each player's strategy is optimal at each information set given opponents' strategies. We show sequential optimality, which does not make any explicit assumption on updating, is equivalent to sequential optimality with respect to beliefs updated using a particular generalization of Bayesian updating. Ambiguity aversion expands the set of equilibria compatib...
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作者：Halac, Marina; Kremer, Ilan
作者单位：Yale University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：A manager who learns privately about a project over time may want to delay quitting it if recognizing failure/lack of success hurts his reputation. In the banking industry, managers may want to roll over bad loans. How do distortions depend on expected project quality? What are the effects of releasing public information about quality? A key feature of banks is that managers learn about project quality from bad news, i.e., a default. We show that in such an environment, distortions tend to inc...
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作者：Boik, Andre; Takahashi, Hidenori
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We study how changes in market structure affect how firms engage in second-degree price discrimination. Specifically, we study how a large incumbent cable firm changes its menu of price-quality offerings and mixed bundles in response to entry Competition strongly decreases the rate at which prices increase in quality and induces the incumbent to introduce additional medium- to high-quality offerings that the incumbent could have introduced absent competition but chose not to. Our findings are ...
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作者：Hubbard, Thomas N.; Mazzeo, Michael J.
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Standard models that guide competition policy imply that demand increases should lead to more, not fewer firms. However, Sutton's (1991) model shows that demand increases instead can lead to shakeouts if non-price competition takes the form of fixed investments. We investigate this effect in the 1960s-1980s hotel and motel industry, where quality competition arose through investments in swimming pools. We show that demand increases associated with highway openings led to fewer firms, particula...
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作者：Arad, Ayala; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：We develop a framework for analyzing multidimensional reasoning in strategic interactions, which is motivated by two experimental findings: (i) in games with a large and complex strategy space, players tend to think in terms of strategy characteristics rather than the strategies themselves; (ii) in their strategic deliberation, players consider one characteristic at a time. A multidimensional equilibrium is a vector of characteristics representing a stable mode of behavior: a player does not w...
