A Theory of Organizational Dynamics: Internal Politics and Efficiency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cai, Hongbin; Feng, Hong; Weng, Xi
• 署名单位: Peking University; Harbin Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160237
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 94-130
• 关键词: decisions; STANDARDS; diversity; search; voters; rules; clubs; MODEL

摘要

We consider a three-member organization in which one member retires in each period and the incumbent members vote to admit a candidate to fill the vacancy. Candidates differ in quality center dot and belong to one of two types, and majority-type members share the total rent of that period. We characterize the symmetric Markov equilibria with undominated strategies and compare the long-term welfare among them. Unanimity voting is better than majority voting at promoting long-term welfare. In addition, organizations with a certain degree of incongruity perform better in the long run than either harmonious or very divided organizations.