Incomplete Disclosure: Evidence of Signaling and Countersignaling
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bederson, Benjamin B.; Jin, Ginger Zhe; Leslie, Phillip; Quinn, Alexander J.; Zou, Ben
署名单位：
University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Michigan State University
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7669
DOI：
10.1257/mic.20150178
发表日期：
2018
页码：
41-66
关键词：
摘要：
In 2011, Maricopa County adopted voluntary restaurant hygiene grade cards (A, B, C, D). Using inspection results between 2007 and 2013, we show that only 58 percent of the subsequent inspections led to online grade posting. Although the disclosure rate in general declines with inspection outcome, higher-quality A restaurants are less likely to disclose than lower-quality As. After examining potential explanations, we believe the observed pattern is best explained by a mixture of signaling and countersignaling: the better A restaurants use nondisclosure as a countersignal, while worse As and better Bs use disclosure to stand out from the other restaurants.
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