Two-Sided Investment and Matching with Multidimensional Cost Types and Attributes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dizdar, Deniz
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150147
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 86-123
• 关键词: premarital investments; marriage; COMPETITION; EFFICIENCY; MARKETS

摘要

Heterogeneous buyers and sellers must make investments before entering a continuum assignment market. I show that efficient ex post contracting equilibria (Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 2001b) exist in a general assignment game framework. I then shed light on what enables and what precludes coordination failures. A simple condition-absence of technological multiplicity-guarantees efficient investments for each pair, but a mismatch of agents may still occur. However, using optimal transport theory, I also show that mismatch is heavily constrained in certain multidimensional environments with differentiated agents and no technological multiplicity. Under technological multiplicity, even extreme ex ante heterogeneity need not preclude inefficiencies.