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作者：Anesi, Vincent; Facchini, Giovanni
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of Nottingham; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：Coercion is used by one government (the sender) to influence the trade practices of another (the target). We build a two-country trade model in which coercion can be exercised unilaterally or channeled through a weak international organization without enforcement powers. We show that unilateral coercion may be ineffective because signaling incentives lead the sender to demand a concession so substantial to make it unacceptable to the target. If the sender can instead commit to the internationa...
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作者：Luco, Fernando
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：How do different switching costs affect choices and competition in a private pension system? I answer this question in a setting in which variation in employment status allows me to identify two switching costs that jointly affect enrollees' decisions: the cost of evaluating financial information and the cost of the bureaucratic process that enrollees must navigate when switching. I use this variation to estimate the different switching costs and study their impact on competition among pension...
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作者：Romanyuk, Gleb; Smolin, Alex
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Bonn
摘要：Short-lived buyers arrive to a platform over time and randomly match with sellers. The sellers stay at the platform and decide whether to accept incoming requests. The platform designs what buyer information the sellers observe before deciding to form a match. We show full information disclosure leads to a market failure because of excessive rejections by the sellers. If sellers are homogeneous, then coarse information policies are able to restore efficiency. If sellers are heterogeneous, then...
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作者：Attar, Andrea; Casamatta, Catherine; Chassagnon, Arnold; Decamps, Jean-Paul
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Tours; Paris School of Economics
摘要：We study capital markets in which investors compete by designing financial contracts to control an entrepreneur's ability to side trade and default on multiple loans. We show that covenants may have anticompetitive effects: in particular, they prevent investors from providing additional funds and reduce the entrepreneur's investment capacity. As a result, a large number of inefficient allocations is supported at equilibrium. We propose a subsidy mechanism similar to guarantee funds in financia...
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作者：Aoyagi, Masaki; Bhaskar, V.; Frechette, Guillaume R.
作者单位：University of Osaka; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; New York University
摘要：This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of the monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Keeping the strategic form of the stage game fixed, we examine the behavior of subjects when information about past actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public (public monitoring), and noisy and private (private monitoring). We find that the subjects sustain cooperation in every treatment, but that their strategies differ across the th...
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作者：Cerulli-Harms, Annette; Goette, Lorenz; Sprenger, Charles
作者单位：University of Lausanne; University of London Courtauld Institute of Art; University of Bonn; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We test expectations-based reference dependence in market experiments with probabilistic forced exchange. Koszegi and Rabin (2006) predict that when the probability of forced exchange increases, individuals cannot expect to stick with the status quo, and should grow more willing to exchange. This mechanism may eliminate and even reverse the endowment effect (Knetsch and Sinden 1984; Kohneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990). In a series of experiments with overall 930 subjects, we show some tentativ...
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作者：Angelucci, Charles; Cage, Julia
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：We model the consequences on newspapers' content and prices of a reduction in advertising revenues. Newspapers choose the size of their newsroom, and readers are heterogeneous in their ideal amount of journalistic-intensive content. We show that a reduction in advertising revenues lowers newspapers' incentives to produce journalistic-intensive content. We also build a unique dataset on French newspapers between 1960 and 1974 and perform a difference-in-differences analysis exploiting the intro...
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作者：Fahn, Matthias; Klein, Nicolas
作者单位：Johannes Kepler University Linz; Johannes Kepler University Linz; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We analyze a relational-contracting problem, in which the principal has private information about the future value of the relationship. In order to reduce bonus payments, the principal is tempted to claim that the value of the future relationship is lower than it actually is. To induce truth-telling, the optimal relational contract may introduce distortions after a bad report. For some levels of the discount factor, output is reduced by more than would be sequentially optimal. This distortion ...
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作者：Jagadeesan, Ravi
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：Sonmez (2013) and Sonmez and Switzer (2013) used matching theory with unilaterally substitutable priorities to propose mechanisms to match cadets to military branches. This paper shows that, alternatively, the Sonmez and Sonmez-Switzer mechanisms can be constructed as descending salary adjustment processes in Kelso-Crawford (1982) economies in which cadets are (grossly) substitutable. The lengths of service contracts serve as (inverse) salaries. The underlying substitutability explains the uni...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Vespa, Emanuel
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：We study the effect of how types are assigned to participants in a signaling-game experiment. The sender has two actions, In and Out, and two types. In one treatment, types are i.i.d. in every period, and senders gather experience with both types. In the other, types are assigned once-and-for-all, and feedback is type specific. The theory of learning in games predicts that the non-Nash but self-confirming equilibrium where some fraction of types play Out can persist in the fixed-type treatment...
