The Competitive Effects of Transmission Infrastructure in the Indian Electricity Market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ryan, Nicholas
• 署名单位: Yale University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180191
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 202-242
• 关键词: Cournot competition; POWER; electrification; auctions; industry; REFORM; IMPACT

摘要

The integration of markets may improve efficiency by lowering costs or reducing local market power. India, seeking to reduce electricity shortages, set up a new power market, in which transmission constraints sharply limit trade between regions. During congested hours, measures of market competitiveness fall and firms raise bid prices. I use confidential bidding data to estimate the costs of power supply and simulate market outcomes with more transmission capacity. Counterfactual simulations show that transmission expansion increases market surplus by 22 percent, enough to justify the investment. One-third of this gain is due to sellers' response to a more integrated grid.