Orchestrating Information Acquisition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lu, Jingfeng; Ye, Lixin; Feng, X. I. N.
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; Nanjing University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190114
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 420-465
• 关键词: price auctions; optimal search; entry; COORDINATION; mechanisms; disclosure; efficient; CONTRACTS; DESIGN

摘要

We study how to orchestrate information acquisition in an environment where bidders endowed with original estimates (types ) about their private values can acquire further information by incurring a cost. We consider both single-round and fully sequential shortlisting rules. The optimal single-round shortlisting rule admits the set of most efficient bidders that maximizes expected virtual surplus adjusted by the second-stage signal and information acquisition cost. When shortlisting is fully sequential, at each round, the most efficient remaining bidder is admitted provided that her conditional expected contribution to the virtual surplus is positive.