Dynamic Persuasion with Outside Information
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bizzotto, Jacopo; Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien
署名单位：
Oslo Metropolitan University (OsloMet); Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; BI Norwegian Business School
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7669
DOI：
10.1257/mic.20180141
发表日期：
2021
页码：
179-194
关键词：
摘要：
A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside information. The combined effect of the deadline and outside information creates incentives for the principal to keep uncertainty high in the first periods so as to persuade the agent close to the deadline. We characterize the equilibrium, compare it to the single-player decision problem in which exogenous outside information is the agent's only source of information, and examine the welfare implications of our analysis.
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