Rational Inattention in the Infield

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bhattacharya, Vivek; Howard, Greg
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200310
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 348-393
• 关键词: professionals play minimax; attention; equilibria; COORDINATION; COMPETITION; experience; SALIENCE; thinking; CHOICE; form

摘要

This paper provides evidence of rational inattention by experienced professionals in strategic interactions. We add rational inattention to a game of matching pennies with state-dependent payoffs. Unlike the full-information, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, payoffs of different actions need not be equated state by state. Moreover, players respond partially to payoff differences, this responsiveness is stronger when attention costs are lower, strategies converge to full-information Nash as stakes increase, and average payoffs across all states are approximately equal across actions. We test these predic-tions using data on millions of pitches from Major League Baseball, where we observe strategies, payoffs, and proxies for attention costs. (JEL C72, D83, D91, L83, Z21)