The Effect of Sequentiality on Cooperation in Repeated Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ghidoni, Riccardo; Suetens, Sigrid
• 署名单位: University of Bologna; Tilburg University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200268
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 58-77
• 关键词: infinitely repeated games; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; strategic uncertainty; equilibrium selection; folk theorem; COMMUNICATION; preferences; INFORMATION; CONTRACTS; fairness

摘要

Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium relative to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that sequen-tial play reduces strategic uncertainty. We show in an experiment that this has large consequences for behavior. We find that with inter-mediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases the cooper-ation rate by around 40 percentage points, whereas with very low or very high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates are respectively very low or very high in both settings. (JEL C72, C73)