A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Horner, Johannes; Renault, Jerome
• 署名单位: Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106227
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: long-run; equilibrium

摘要

We provide a Folk theorem for finitely repeated games under imperfect public monitoring, under a strengthening of the standard assumptions required for finitely repeated games with perfect monitoring, and of those for discounted repeated games under imperfect public monitoring. Our proof uses standard recursive methods and assumes the existence of a public randomization device. Three counterexamples show in which sense our assumptions are tight.