On the relationship between damage and deception

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sobel, Joel
• 署名单位: University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106148
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: information

摘要

This paper introduces a family of definitions of deceptive behavior. The definitions provide different ways to describe the notion that deceptive behavior misleads a player by inducing inaccurate beliefs. For each definition of deception, I identify a class of preferences under which behavior is deceptive if and only if it harms any player with preferences in the class. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D02; C90; C72. Keywords: communication, damage, deception.