Intergenerational cultural transmission with social interactions as an evolutionary game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wu, Jiabin
• 署名单位: University of Oregon
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106233
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: dynamics; equilibrium; socialization; COOPERATION; selection

摘要

This paper studies a multi-trait cultural transmission model with social interactions. The resulting cultural dynamic is equivalent to an evolutionary dynamic on a population game that combines social payoffs and cultural biases. This transformation allows us to apply tools from evolutionary game theory to examine cultural homogeneity and heterogeneity. We show that when social interactions have a coordination nature, cultural biases can push the cultural dynamic toward selecting a culturally homogeneous equilibrium that is efficient for those interactions. In contrast, when interactions have an anti-coordination nature, cultural biases usually drive the dynamic toward a culturally heterogeneous state that differs from the efficient equilibrium.