Competition in persuasion in the attention economy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Innocenti, Federico
• 署名单位: University of Konstanz
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.04.005
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Bayesian persuasion; news; INFORMATION; media

摘要

Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) show that competition among senders benefits receivers if and only if the information environment is Blackwell-connected. This paper shows that introducing receivers' limited attention and heterogeneous beliefs can overturn this result. Even in a Blackwell-connected information environment, information revelation may be lower under duopoly than under monopoly. Indeed, limited attention may incentivize receivers to sort into the audiences of like-minded senders. In turn, this adverse sorting can make it optimal for senders to reveal less information.