Long-run efficiency with local interactions and heterogeneous types

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lillethun, Erik
• 署名单位: Colgate University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.06.009
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: evolution; COORDINATION; games

摘要

In evolutionary game theory, when a population of players with the same preferences may freely choose a location in which to interact with other players, previous literature has shown that long-run evolutionary forces select in favor of payoff-dominant equilibria. In this paper, I extend this location choice aspect of evolutionary game theory to the case of two different payoff types of players in 2 & times; 2 games. I show that whether or not payoff-dominant equilibrium selection occurs depends on the precise interaction of types, especially whether they exhibit mutual strategic homophily or a mix of homophily and heterophily. The former case guarantees payoff-dominant equilibria, and the latter case may not, because coordination becomes imperfect and may settle on an inefficient strategy.