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作者：Núñez, M; Rafels, C
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona
摘要：A characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game is given in terms of the reduced marginal worth vectors. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his or her marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his or her predecessors. This set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is proved to be the set of extreme points of the core of the assign...
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作者：Asheim, GB; Dufwenberg, M
作者单位：University of Oslo; Stockholm University
摘要：The concept of 'fully permissible sets' is defined by an algorithm that eliminates strategy subsets. It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. The concept refines the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction. (C...
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作者：Durieu, J; Solal, P
作者单位：Universite Jean Monnet
摘要：We consider a 2 x 2 coordination game where each agent interacts with his neighbors on a ring. Ellison (1993, Econometrica 61, 1047-1071) shows that the discrete dynamical system generated by the myopic best-reply rule converges to a Nash equilibrium or to a two-period limit cycle. Following Young (1993, Econometrica. 61, 57-84), we consider a best-reply process with a sampling procedure. Particularly, we introduce a spatial sampling procedure: each agent observes a sample of information in hi...
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作者：Rath, KP; Zhao, GY
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; National University of Singapore
摘要：It is well known that in a duopoly model of product choice with quadratic transportation cost, the firms locate at the extreme endpoints of the market. Jehiel (1992, Int. J. Ind. Organ, 10, 633641) has examined this model in an infinite horizon setting where in the initial period the firms choose location and in subsequent periods charge the Nash bargaining solution prices. Then, in the unique equilibrium both firms locate at the center of the market. This paper examines the case when the firm...
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作者：Samuelson, L; Swinkels, JM
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We explore the interaction between evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences. To do so, we define a limit Nash equilibrium for a lexicographic game as the limit of Nash equilibria of nearby games with continuous preferences. Nash equilibria of lexicographic games are limit Nash equilibria, but not conversely. Modified evolutionarily stable strategies (Binmore and Samuelson, 1992. J. Econ. Theory 57, 278-305) are limit Nash equilibria. Modified evolutionary stability differs from lex...
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作者：Schmidt, D; Shupp, R; Walker, JM; Ostrom, E
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Ball State University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：This paper presents results from a series of experiments designed to test the impact on subject behavior of changes in the risk dominance and payoff dominance characteristics of two player coordination games. The main finding is that changes in risk dominance significantly affect play of the subjects, whereas changes in the level of payoff dominance do not. Observed history of play also has an important influence on subject behavior, both when subjects are randomly rematched after each game an...
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作者：Yildiz, M
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Given any two-person economy, consider an alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information where the proposers offer prices, and the responders either choose the amount of trade at the offered prices or reject the offer. We provide conditions under which the outcomes of all subgame-perfect equilibria converge to the Walrasian equilibrium (the price and the allocation) as the discount rates approach 1. Therefore, price-taking behavior can be achieved with only two agents. (C) 2003 El...
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作者：Amir, R; Evstigneev, I; Wooders, J
作者单位：University of Manchester; University of Arizona
摘要：This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We esta...
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作者：Echenique, F; Sabarwal, T
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; California Institute of Technology
摘要：Some results in the monotone comparative statics literature tell us that if a parameter increases, some old equilibria are smaller than some new equilibria. We give a sufficient condition such that at a new parameter value every old equilibrium is smaller than every new equilibrium. We also adapt a standard algorithm to compute a minimal such newer parameter value and apply this algorithm to a game of network externalities. Our results are independent of a theory of equilibrium selection and a...
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作者：Binmore, K; Samuelson, L; Young, P
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random best-response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable. This allows us to characterize the implications of these dynamics in simple bargaining games. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
