Adaptive play with spatial sampling

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Durieu, J; Solal, P
• 署名单位: Universite Jean Monnet
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00012-5
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 189-195
• 关键词: Coordination game; neighborhood; sampling procedure; cycles; stochastic stability

摘要

We consider a 2 x 2 coordination game where each agent interacts with his neighbors on a ring. Ellison (1993, Econometrica 61, 1047-1071) shows that the discrete dynamical system generated by the myopic best-reply rule converges to a Nash equilibrium or to a two-period limit cycle. Following Young (1993, Econometrica. 61, 57-84), we consider a best-reply process with a sampling procedure. Particularly, we introduce a spatial sampling procedure: each agent observes a sample of information in his neighborhood and plays a best reply to it. We show that if the size of the sample of information is not too large, the best-reply process converges almost surely to a Nash equilibrium. If in addition agents experiment with small probabilities, we show that, in most cases, the risk-dominant equilibrium prevails in the long run. Furthermore, it turns out that the convergence is faster than in Ellison. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.