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作者：Ginsburgh, V; Zang, I
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：We discuss a game in which service providers (e.g., museums) team up in offering a limited time access pass allowing unlimited usage of their services. In this game, a natural way to allocate the joint income from the sale of passes among the service providers is by using the Shapley value. We show that, for the particular game considered, the Shapley value takes a very intuitive and computationally simple form. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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作者：Gale, D; Kariv, S
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We extend the standard model of social learning in two ways. First, we introduce a social network and assume that agents can only observe the actions of agents to whom they are connected by this network. Secondly, we allow agents to choose a different action at each date. If the network satisfies a connectedness assumption, the initial diversity resulting from diverse private information is eventually replaced by uniformity of actions, though not necessarily of beliefs, in finite time with pro...
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作者：Blume, LE
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：Recent advances in evolutionary game theory have introduced noise into decisionmaking to select in favor of certain equilibria in coordination games. Noisy decisionmaking is justified on bounded rationality grounds, and consequently the sources of noise are left unmodelled. This methodological approach can only be successful if the results do not depend too much on the nature of the noise process. This paper investigates invariance to noise of these results, both for the random matching paradi...
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作者：Gneezy, U; Haruvy, E; Roth, AE
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Chicago; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Harvard University
摘要：We study a reverse ultimatum game, in which proposers have multiple chances to offer responders a division of some fixed pie. The game ends if the responder accepts an offer, or if, following a rejection, the proposer decides not to make a better offer. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium gives the proposer the minimum possible payoff. Nevertheless, the experimental results are not too different from those of the standard ultimatum game, although proposers generally receive slightly less th...
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作者：Hart, S; Mas-Colell, A
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：\Regret-based dynamics have been introduced and studied in the context of discrete-time repeated play. Here we carry out the corresponding analysis in continuous time. We observe that, in contrast to (smooth) fictitious play or to evolutionary models, the appropriate state space for this analysis is the space of distributions on the product of the players' pure action spaces (rather than the product of their mixed action spaces). We obtain relatively simple proofs for some results known in the...
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作者：Abreu, D; Sethi, R
作者单位：Columbia University; Princeton University
摘要：A large and growing literature on reputation in games builds on the insight that the possibility of one or more players being boundedly rational can have significant effects on equilibrium behavior. This literature leaves unexplained the presence of behavioral players in the first place, as well as the particular forms of irrationality assumed and the population shares of the various types. In this paper we endogenize departures from rationality on the basis of an evolutionary stability criter...
