Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Amir, R; Evstigneev, I; Wooders, J
• 署名单位: University of Manchester; University of Arizona
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00541-9
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 183-207
• 关键词: oligopolistic R&D; endogenous spillovers; research joint ventures; R&D cartel

摘要

This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers, and within the context of a standard specification, derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.