Equilibrium selection in bargaining models

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Binmore, K; Samuelson, L; Young, P
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London; Johns Hopkins University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00146-5
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 296-328
• 关键词: Nash demand game; contract game; evolutionary dynamics; equilibrium selection; Risk dominance; Best response; stochastic stability

摘要

This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random best-response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable. This allows us to characterize the implications of these dynamics in simple bargaining games. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.