Walrasian bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yildiz, M
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00154-4
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 465-487
• 关键词: Bargaining; competitive equilibrium; implementation

摘要

Given any two-person economy, consider an alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information where the proposers offer prices, and the responders either choose the amount of trade at the offered prices or reject the offer. We provide conditions under which the outcomes of all subgame-perfect equilibria converge to the Walrasian equilibrium (the price and the allocation) as the discount rates approach 1. Therefore, price-taking behavior can be achieved with only two agents. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.